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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN AN
UNSTABLE ECONOMY:
JUDICIAL REALLOCATION OF CONTRACTUAL
RISKS UNDER UCC SECTION 2-615
THOMAS

R. HURSTI

INTRODUCTION

On September 8, 1975, Westinghouse Electric Corporation public-

ly announced that it would be unable to fulfill its commitments to
several large electric utility companies to supply uranium under long

term, fixed price contracts.1 Several weeks later, after several of these
utilities had filed suit against Westinghouse as a result of its announcement, Westinghouse commenced an interpleader action against the companies with which it had contracted, seeking a judicial determination of
the rights of each to the available stockpile of uranium. 2 Westinghouse

reportedly had on hand enough uranium to supply only nineteen percent of its total commitment under these contracts and had refused to

purchase additional uranium because the market price had drastically
increased during the past few years.' Full performance of the contracts,
therefore, would result in Westinghouse incurring a substantial loss.
For this reason, Westinghouse is claiming that it is entitled to terminate
the contracts because performance has become "commercially impracticable" under section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code.4
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida; B.A., 1966, University of
Wisconsin; J.D., 1969, Harvard University; member of the Wisconsin Bar. The author
is indebted to the Law and Liberty Project of the Institute for Humane Studies for the
Summer Fellowship which enabled him to prepare this article. The author also wishes
to thank his research assistants, Becky Powhatan and Betsy Ellwanger, and his colleague,
Professor Darryl Deaktor, for assisting in the preparation of this article. The views
expressed herein are, however, solely those of the author.
1. Barron's National Business & Financial Weekly, Sep. 15, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
2. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Alabama Power Co., Civ. No. 75-1393 (W.D.
Pa., filed Oct. 30, 1975).
3. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 1975, at 10, col. 3.
4. Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good
faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
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This type of dispute is likely to arise increasingly often since the
economy of the United States has, over the past decade, been subjected
to fluctuations of a magnitude not witnessed for over a generation.
Beginning with the Vietnam War, we have witnessed a series of
inflationary surges of increasing intensity. During 1975, the economy
experienced its most serious recession since the 1930's; yet the inflation
rate, while down considerably from the twelve percent rate of 1974,
remains at approximately seven percent, a rate which would have been
considered by most to be completely unacceptable only a decade ago.6
This inflation has been accompanied by the demise of the international monetary system which had prevailed since its establishment at
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1947. Two devaluations of the dollar
against gold have occurred," and a system of floating exchange rates has
been substituted for the fixed exchange rates established at the Confer7
ence.
In the fall of 1973, the oil embargo initiated by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led to serious shortages of
gasoline, heating oil, and a variety of other petroleum based products.
The embargo was followed by a quadrupling of the price of oil which
further intensified the inflationary pressures already present in the economy. The embargo, coupled with a shortage of natural gas, led to the
establishment of the Federal Energy Office, subsequently called the
Federal Energy Administration (FEA), and the promulgation of a
maze of regulations governing the pricing and allocation of various
fuels."
Unfortunately, none of these problems seems likely to disappear in
the immediate future. Although the economy is recovering from the
severe recession of 1974-75, some are already predicting a renewed
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the
seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries
among his customers but may at his option include regular customers not
then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or
non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the
estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615.

5. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
6. The price of gold was increased from $35 to $38 per troy ounce by the Par
Value Modification Act, Act of Mar. 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116. This
Act was subsequently amended to further increase the price of gold to $42.22 per troy
ounce. 31 U.S.C.A. § 449 (Supp. 1976).
7. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 25, 1975, at 8, col. 4.
8. See generally 10 C.F.R. §§ 210-12 (1975).
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inflationary surge of at least as great intensity as that of 1973-74. 9
Notwithstanding some minor reductions in the price of certain types of
oil, the OPEC oil cartel shows little signs of breaking down in the
immediate future. 10 Even if the cartel does fail to hold athe line on the
price of oil, the problems of a scarcity of oil and natural gas will almost
certainly remain a serious concern. Thus, the FEA will most likely
continue to exist for some time. Finally, all attempts to reform the
international monetary system have met with failure."
Each of these economic problems poses a great challenge to the
draftsmen of contracts and to the courts charged with contract interpretation. An unforeseen increase in the price of a crucial commodity can
easily transform a contract for the sale of goods that would have been
profitable to the seller at the time it was signed into a losing proposition.
The same result can occur in a contract in international trade due to
the fluctuation of exchange rates if the seller has not provided for this
contingency.
More seriously, if the seller finds that fuel or other supplies are
unavailable due to embargo, governmental regulation, or simply excessive demand, he may find himself unable to perform the contract either
partially or totally, thus exposing himself to substantial damages in a
lawsuit for breach of contract.
There are two basic methods by which the seller may protect
himself against this type of occurrence. The first is by careful drafting
of the contract itself. Inflation may be guarded against by use of
devices such as the "cost-plus" contract, the escalator clause tied to some
sort of price index, the advance requirements contract at a fixed price
for the commodities or other articles needed by the seller to manufacture
the finished product, or by other methods.' 2 Likewise, changes in the
value of currencies may be guarded against through sales or purchases
of currency futures, or, more simply, by providing for payment of the
contract price in the seller's own currency. Shortages due to embargo
or government regulation are more difficult to deal with unless inventory
9. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 6; id., Sep. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
10. In fact, the OPEC cartel raised most crude oil prices approximately 10% as
of October 1, 1975. See id., Sept. 29, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
11. Id., Aug. 25, 1975, at 8, col. 4.
12. A detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article. For
further information see generally Dawson & Coultrap, Contracting by Reference to
Price Indices, 33 MicH. L. REv. 685 (1935); White, Drafting Contracts in a Shortage
Economy, in PLI, BREACH OF CONTRACT IN A SHORTAGE ECONOMY REvisrrED 61
(1974).
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stockpiling is feasible, but at least the seller can always provide in the

contract that his obligation shall be discharged or postponed if he is
unable to obtain the necessary materials to perform.

Although making express provision in the contract for economic
disturbances which affect the seller's ability to perform is the most
satisfactory method for the seller to protect himself, situations will arise
in which the seller for one reason or another has failed to provide for a
contingency which has affected his ability to perform. When this
occurs, the only remaining method by which the seller can avoid incurring a substantial loss is to be discharged from his contractual obligation
by the courts. The doctrines allowing a promisor to be discharged from

his contractual obligations if performance of such obligations have
become impossible or impracticable are commonly known as "impossibility of performance" and "frustration of purpose."'u These doctrines
have been adopted, with certain important modifications, by the Uniform Commercial Code.' 4

As a result of the increasing instability in the economy of the
United States, it seems likely that the courts will be asked with increasing frequency to invoke the doctrines of impossibility of performance or
frustration of purpose to discharge the promisor from contracts that
have become impossible or unprofitable to perform. Judicial use of the
doctrine of impossibility is necessary in some instances to prevent the
promisor from incurring substantial liability against which he could not
reasonably have protected himself and which the parties never contemplated when the contract was formed. Nonetheless, excessive utilization
of the impossibility defense poses the threat that the promisor will be
13. The terms "impossibility of performance" and "frustration of purpose" have not
always been used uniformly by various courts. For the purposes of this article, these
terms will be used to refer to the concepts described under those names in the
Restatement of Contracts. "Impossibility of performance," therefore, will be used to refer to situations in which performance of the contract by the promisor has been impossible or extremely difficult. RESTATEmENT oF CoNTRACTs § 454 (1932). "Frustration of
purpose" refers to situations in which performance of the contract by the promisor is
literally possible but the motive or purpose for which the promisor entered into the
contract will not be achieved by such performance. Id. § 288. To illustrate, a case in
which a distributor was unable to obtain enough gasoline to satisfy his contractual
obligations to supply gasoline to service stations would involve impossibility of performance. And a case in which a grain dealer had contracted to supply wheat to a bakery at
a price of $2.00 per bushel where the price of wheat reached over $4.00 a bushel before
the dealer had purchased enough wheat to fulfill the contract would involve frustration of
purpose. In the latter case, performance of the contract is literally possible but the
dealer's purpose in entering into the contract, i.e. to make a profit on the resale of wheat,
has been frustrated.
14. UNwoRm COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-613 to -616.
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relieved from liability on contracts in situations in which it was assumed
that he would take steps to guard against the contingency that rendered performance impossible. Thus, the doctrine of impossibility, if
not used with discretion, may be used to reallocate business risks and
discourage the promisor from taking reasonable precautions to ensure
that he will be able to perform the contract.
This article will examine those cases in which the impossibility
defense has been raised in the context of economic disruptions to
determine the extent to which the courts have been allowing the promisor to be discharged from his contractual obligation. In order to make
the topic manageable, this examination will be confined to cases involving the sale of goods which are within the coverage of the Uniform
Commercial Code. It is the author's position that, although the courts
have thus far not made excessive utilization of the impossibility of
performance provisions of the Code, these provisions, as they stand, give
the courts too much discretion in deciding whether the promisor should
be discharged from the contract and, as such, pose a serious threat to
traditional concepts of private decisionmaking and freedom of contract.
The article concludes with proposed amendments to the UCC which
attempt to deal with the problems raised.
ThE DEFENSES OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
AND FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE AT COMMON LAg AND

UNDER TIM UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The doctrines of impossibility of performance and frustration of
purpose are comparatively recent innovations of the common law. 5
For many centuries, the so-called "rule of absolute liability" prevailed.
Under this rule, the promisor was liable in damages for failure to
perform his obligations under a contract even if his performance was
impossible or the purpose for which he had entered into the contract was
frustrated by some supervening event.
The classic case illustrating the rule of absolute liability is Paradine
v. Jane.' In that case, plaintiff, the lessor, sued defendant, the lessee,
for unpaid rent. Defendant's plea was that a foreign army had invaded
the country and occupied the land in question, thus preventing defend15. A complete discussion of the development of the doctrines of impossibility of
performance and frustration of purpose is beyond the scope of this article. The reader

interested in this matter may wish to consult G. GiMoRE, Tim DniTH oF CoNTRACt
(1974) and Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18
MICH. L. REv. 589 (1920).
16. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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ant from taking any profits from the land as he had intended when he
had taken the lease. On demurrer, defendant's plea was held to be
insufficient. The court reasoned that since defendant had not conditioned his promise to pay rent on his ability to peacefully enjoy the land,
he was bound to pay the rent even though he -had been unable to use it.
The court pointed out that the law will not protect a party to a contract
beyond his own agreement and that since defendant was to have the
advantage of all profits accruing from the land, it was fair that he bear
7
the risk of casual losses.
Thus, under the rule of absolute liability, the promisor is held
strictly accountable for failure to perform -his contractual obligations,
regardless of the reason for nonperformance. If the promisor desires to
be discharged from liability on a contract because performance becomes
impossible or his purpose in entering into the contract has been frustrated, it is his responsibility to provide for such discharge in the contract.
Because the rule of absolute liability led to seemingly -harsh results,
the courts came to recognize certain circumstances in which a contractual obligation might be discharged even though the parties had not
provided for discharge in the contract. This "rule of discharge" is
illustrated in the case of Krell v. Henry.'8 Defendant had entered into a
contract with plaintiff to hire plaintiff's flat for the two days on which
the coronation of Edward VII was to take place in order to view that
event. When the coronation was cancelled, defendant refused to pay
the balance due upon the agreement with plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued
for the balance due, and defendant counterclaimed for the deposit
which he -had previously given plaintiff. The King's Bench affirmed a
judgment for defendant on both the claim and the counterclaim, although there was nothing in the contract itself stating that its purpose
was to enable defendant to view the coronation procession or discharging defendant from liability if the coronation failed to take place. 10 The
court quoted from Taylor v. Caldwell0 that
17. Although some commentators have erroneously referred to Paradine as a case
involving the impossibility defense, it is in fact a case involving frustration of purpose.
Schlegel, -Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things-The
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RuTGERs L. REv. 419 (1969). In Paradine
there was no claim that plaintiff had not been able to convey the leasehold to defendant,
nor that defendant had been unable to pay plaintiff. Rather, the defense was that
defendant's purpose in entering into the lease, i.e. to earn a profit from the land, had
been frustrated as a result of its occupation by a foreign army.
18. [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
19. Id. at 754.
20. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
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where, from the nature of the contract, it appears that the parties
must from the beginning have known that it could not -be fulfilled
unless, when the time for the fulfilment of the contract arrived,
some particular specified thing continued to exist, so that when
entering into the contract they must have contemplated such continued existence as the foundation of what was to be done; there,
in the absence of any express or implied warranty that the thing
shall exist, the contract is not to be considered a positive contract,
but as subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible
from the perishing of the thing without default of the contractor. 21
Most of the leading commentators have concluded that there has
been a gradual trend over the past century toward adopting the so-called
"rule of discharge" as opposed to the rule of absolute liability, 22 although there are notable holdings to the contrary. 23 Nevertheless, the
law of impossibility remains in a rather confused state, and its application to a given situation cannot be predicted in advance with much
confidence. 24
A brief synopsis of the major provisions of the Restatement of
Contracts dealing with frustration and impossibility provides a good
overview of the present scope of these doctrines at common law. The
Restatement devotes a full seventeen sections to the topic of impossibility.2 Apparently favoring the rule of discharge, the draftsmen defined
the term "impossibility" to include "not only strict impossibility but
impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved. 26 The Restatement distinguishes between "objective impossibility" and "subjective impossibility. 27 Objective impossibility is that which is "due to the nature of the thing to be
done. 2 8 Subjective impossibility is that which is due to the inability of
21. [1903] 2 K.B. at 748.
CoNTAcrs § 1320, at 321-24
ON THE LAW OF CoNmAcTs 359-60 (2d

22. 6 A. CoBmI,
HANDBOOK

(2d ed. 1962); L. SimpsoN,

ed. 1965); 6 S.

WILLISTON,

CoNTRAcTs § 1931, at 5408-09 (rev. ed. 1938).
23. See, e.g., Portland Section of the Council of Jewish Women v. Sisters of

Charity, 266 Ore. 448, 513 P.2d 1183 (1973), in which the court refused to discharge
defendant from its agreement to provide hospital care in perpetuity for one person of
plaintiff's choosing in return for a contribution made by plaintiff to defendant hospital in
1927 of $5000, despite an increase in hospital costs from several dollars per day to
approximately $140 per day. Id. at 455, 513 P.2d at 1187.
24. 6 A. CoanN, supra note 22, § 1325, at 338-39.
25. RESTATEMENT OF CoNrA=rS §§ 228, 454-69 (1932).

26. Id. § 454.
27. Id. § 455.
28. Id. Curiously, no example of pure objective impossibility is given in the
comments to section 455, although several examples of subjective impossibility are given.
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the individual promisor to perform the bargain and does not discharge
the promisor's duty of performance.29 Objective impossibility, if existing at the time the contract is entered into, prevents the formation of the
contract30 and, if arising after the formation of the contract, discharges
the promisor's duty to perform provided that the promisor had no
previous knowledge that the contingency would occur, was not responsible for its occurrence, and did not assume the risk of its occurrence in
the contract. 3"
The Restatement then lists several specific types of occurrences that
will discharge a contractual duty. These include governmental action
that prevents performance or renders it illegal,3 2 death or serious illness
of the promisor who has contracted to render personal services,83 the

destruction of things or the physical incapacity of persons necessary for
performance,3 4 and the non-existence of any other facts that the parties
either expressly or impliedly agreed must be in existence at the time of
performance.3 5

Finally, there are specific sections dealing with the promisor's
obligations in the event of "temporary impossibility,"3 6 "partial impossibility,' 7r "impossibility of performing some but not all bargains," 88 "apprehension of impossibility" by the promisor before or during performance,3 9 "unanticipated difficulty," 40 "rights of restitution" in the event of
impossibility occurring after partial performance,41 and "impossibility in
The following example in which both subjective and objective impossibility are present is
given. "A contracts that he personally will catalogue B'S books during the ensuing
summer. A becomes ill and remains so during the whole summer. A's duty is
discharged since its [sic] performance is made personal by the terms of the contract, and
the impossibility is objective as well as subjective." Id., illustration 4.
29. Id. The Restatement poses the following hypothetical as one example of
subjective impossibility: "A contracts to deliver goods of a certain description to B on a
certain day, time being made of the essence. A becomes ill and is delirious on that day,
and is unable to perform, though he has the goods on hand and could and would have
delivered them had he been in possession of his faculties. His duty is not discharged."
Id., illustration 3.
30. Id. § 456.
31. Id. § 457.
32. Id. §§ 458, 461.
33. Id. § 459.
34. Id. § 460.
35. Id. § 461.
36. Id. § 462.
37. Id. § 463.
38. Id. § 464.
39. Id. §§ 465-66.
40. Id. § 467.
41. Id. § 468.
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alternative contracts" when a contingency renders full performance of a
series of similar contracts impossible.42
The doctrine of frustration of purpose is dealt with in section 288
in an entirely different chapter of the Restatement. This section provides for discharge of the promisor's obligation if the purpose for which
he entered into the contract will not be fulfilled due to the occurrence of
a contingency, provided that both parties were aware that such purpose
was a fundamental reason for the promisor's entering into the contract,
the promisor was not at fault in causing the frustration, and the promi43
sor did not assume the risk that the frustration would occur.
The Uniform Commercial Code deals with 'the doctrines of impossibility and frustration in a series of four sections.44 The central provision is section 2-615, "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions."
This section generally excuses the seller for "delay in delivery or nondelivery in whole or in part under a contract for sale if performance
has become impracticable by the occurrence of a contigency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves
to be invalid, unless the seller has assumed a greater obligation."4"
Sections 2-613, 2-614, and 2-616 deal with specific situations which
are not immediately relevant.48
Thus, under the UCC, the promisor must establish the following
elements to be discharged totally from his contractual obligation:
(1) performance has become "impracticable";
(2) the impracticability was due to the occurrence of some con42. Id. 469.
43. Id. § 288; see, e.g., Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
44. UNIFoios COMmCIAL CODE H9 2-613 to -616. See generally Note, The
Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 836, 880-906 (1957).
45. Urmona COMmmRCrAL CODE § 2-615(a). For the text of section 2-615 see
note 4 supra.
46. UNFORm COMmRCIAL CODE § 2-613 excuses the seller's duty of performance
in certain cases involving the total or partial destruction of goods identified to the
contract. Id. § 2-614(1) allows the seller to substitute a "commercially reasonable'
means of delivery for the one agreed upon if it becomes unavailable or commercially
impracticable. § 2-614(2) allows the buyer to modify the means or manner of payment
to any "commercially substantial equivalent" if the agreed means or manner fails because
of government law or regulation. And section 2-616 gives the buyer the option, upon
receiving notice of a delay or allocation in delivery justified under sections 2-613, 2-614
or 2-615, either to terminate or accept a modification of the contract.
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tingency which the parties expressly or impliedly agreed
would discharge the promisor's duty to perform;
(3) the promisor did not assume the risk that the contingency
would occur;
(4) the promisor seasonably notified the promisee of the delay
in delivery or that delivery would not occur at all; and
(5) the promisor is under no duty to allocate a portion of his production to the promisee if he has not been totally disabled
from performing.
A comparison of the treatments of the impossibility and frustration
doctrines in the Restatement and the UCC reveals several differences.
First, the UCC does not use the word "impossibility" as does the
Restatement. Rather, it makes the basic standard of discharge one of
"impracticability."4 7 While the Restatement's definition of "impossibility" does include "impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable
difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved," 48 the use of the word
"impracticable" in defining the basic standard of discharge in section 2615 of the UCC has been interpreted by some courts to indicate that the
draftsmen of the UCC intended to adopt a more lenient standard for
discharge than that adopted by the Restatement. 9
Secondly, whereas the Restatement treats the doctrines of impossibility and frustration in distinct sections, the UCC abandons the distinction entirely. The official comment to section 2-615 indicates that the
draftsmen intended the "impracticability" standard to encompass both
the traditional concepts of impossibility and frustration.50
Thirdly, with only a few exceptions, the UCC does not attempt to
deal separately with the various types of impossibility or reasons causing
'the impossibility. 51 Thus, the UCC leaves more room for judicial
discretion in applying the general rule of section 2-615 to specific cases.
47. Id. § 2-615.
48. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACrs § 454 (1932).
49. Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
Contra, Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., -Mass. -, 310 N.E.2d
363 (1974).
50. UNwoRM COMMEmcrAL CDE § 2-615, Comments 1 & 4. Although the
doctrines of impossibility of performance and frustration of purpose are not identical, the
policy considerations underlying them are similar. For this reason, they will be
discussed together throughout the remainder of this paper and, for convenience, the term
"impossibility" will be used to refer to both the doctrine of impossibility and the doctrine
of frustration of purpose, unless expressly indicated otherwise.
51. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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Finally, the UCC deals only with situations in which the seller's
obligation will be discharged although courts might well, by analogy,

apply its provisions to buyers in appropriate circumstances. 52
The adoption of the "impracticability" *standard in section 2-615
represents a potentially serious erosion of the right of the buyer and

seller to contract freely on whatever terms and conditions they wish.
The use of such a vague standard enables courts to discharge the seller

from virtually any contractual obligation subject to Article Two of the
UCC in a variety of situations in which economic conditions have
changed between the time the bargain was entered into and the date of
performance.53 Indeed, it appears that it was the intent of the draftsmen of section 2-615 to give the courts this type of latitude.5 4

One reason why the draftsmen of the UCC and, to a lesser extent,
of the Restatement may have resorted to such nebulous standards for
defining the impossibility and frustration doctrines is that a precise

definition of the boundaries of both of these doctrines is almost impossible. As Professor Corbin has concluded:
We can not lay down one simple and all-controlling rule for these
various kinds of frustration and impossibility. Many varying factors
must be considered in each case that arises ....
The problem is
that of allocating in the most generally satisfactory way, the risks
of harm and disappointment that result from supervening events. 55
In order to determine whether courts have, in fact, utilized the
vague standards of section 2-615 to expand the scope of the impossibili52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-613 to -616.
53. The precise remedy -that will be granted by courts when the impossibility
doctrine has been successfully invoked by the promisor will depend on whether the
contract is executory or has been partially performed. In the case of a contract which is
fully executory the court can simply declare the contract void and discharge both parties
from their obligations thereunder. If one party has paid all or part of the contract price,
or has rendered other part performance which can be returned to him, the court can
order that the contract be rescinded with restitution made to the party who has partially
performed. The most difficult situation is that in which part performance has taken
place and it is of a nature such that restitution cannot be made. In this situation, the
fairest solution may be for courts to modify the contract, yet this is difficult to
rationalize under existing doctrine in the United States. See Comment, Apportioning
Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J.
1054 (1960). For a discussion of the treatment of the impossibility situation in other
countries see Smit, Frustration of Contract, A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation,
58 COLUM. L. RFv. 287 (1958).

54. See

UNIFORm COMMERcAL CODE

§ 2-615, Comment 2, which provides: "The

present section deliberately refrains from any effort at an exhaustive expression of
contingencies and is to be interpreted in all cases sought to be brought within its scope in
terms of its underlying reason and purpose."
55. 6 A. CoRaiN, supra note 22, § 1322, at 327.
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ty and frustration doctrines, an examination of the factors which the
courts have traditionally considered in determining whether these doctrines are applicable will be madeA6 It should be kept in mind that the
following analysis has reference to contracts for the sale of goods and
may not necessarily be applicable to situations involving other types of
contracts.
SUBJECTIVE VERSUS OBJECTIVE IMPOSSIBILITY

One factor that some courts have historically deemed signficant in
analyzing an impossibility defense is whether the impossibility is due to
the nature of the performance itself ("objective impossibility") or to the
inability of the particular promisor to perform ("subjective impossibility). 57 The Restatement of Contracts characterizes the distinction as
"between 'the thing cannot be done' and 'I cannot do it.' "1 The
Restatement takes the position that objective impossibility discharges the
promisor but that subjective impossibility does not."
The principle is illustrated by the well known case of Canadian
IndustrialAlcohol Co. v. DunbarMolasses Co.,60 an action by the buyer
against the seller for breach of an executory contract for the sale of
molasses. Defendant, a wholesaler, was unable to provide the agreed
quantity of molasses to plaintiff because of the failure of his supplier to
produce an adequate quantity. The court rejected the defendant-seller's
defense of impossibility because "[t]here is nothing to show that the
defendant would have been unable by a timely contract with the refinery
to have assured itself of a supply sufficient for its needs." 61 However,
the court indicated in dictum that the impossibility defense would have
been sust-ained if the refinery of defendant's supplier had been destroyed
or output had been curtailed because of failure of the sugar crop, a
56. The reader will note that there is a considerable amount of overlap among
these factors. Furthermore, they are not all of the same nature. Some -have to do with
the cause of the impossibility while others focus on the expectations of the parties or

their probable intent.

The reader may find that other commentators have included

categories in addition to, or different than, those used here. By dividing the discussion
of the impossibility doctrine into these categories, the author does not intend to endorse

them but rather to indicate those factors which the courts have purported to consider in

analyzing the defense of impossibility of performance.
57. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
58. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 455, comment a at 845 (1932).
59. Id. § 455.

60. 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
61. Id. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384.
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strike, or if defendant's supplier had breached its contract with defendant for the supply of molasses." 2
Section 2-615 of the UCC does not deal specifically with the
subjective-objective distinction. It is apparent from the comments,
though, that the draftsmen did not intend to overrule prior case law
which developed it.63 Rather, it would appear that the draftsmen felt
that other methods of analysis would be more helpful. As a result, no
recent cases decided under section 2-615 involving contract disruptions
caused by economic instabilities have been found that have relied on the
subjective-objective method of analysis.
In general, it would appear that the UCC's abandonment of the
subjective-objective distinction is sound since it is of questionable value
in analyzing an impossibility defense. One problem with the distinction
is that there are certain types of situations in which the two categories
coincide. These are mainly cases in which the performance promised is
to be done personally by the promisor.6 4 Thus, if an opera singer
becomes ill and is unable to fulfill a contract requiring her personal
performance, then performance is subjectively impossible in that the
promisor is unable to perform. However, performance is also objectively impossible since by the terms of the contract no one else is able
to perform it.6 5
Secondly, and more importantly, there is no logical reason to
distinguish between an event that makes performance impossible to a
given promisor and an event that makes performance impossible to everyone in deciding whether the promisor should be discharged. This
is because the subjective-objective distinction bears only indirectly on the
allocation of the risk of nonperformance made by the parties in the
contract. 66 In many cases, the courts will be correct in assuming that
the parties intended the promisor to assume the risk of contingencies
that affect only his individual ability to perform, but this will not be true
in every case.
Finally, it is often difficult to determine whether the contingency
that renders performance impossible in a particular case is "subjective"
or "objective." For example, in Levy Plumbing Co. v. Standard Sani62. Id. at 199-200, 179 N.E. at 384-85.
63. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4.
64. 6 S. WILLISTON, supranote 22, § 1932, at 5412-13.
65. See note 28 supra.
66. For an excellent discussion of the shortcomings of the subjective-objective
distinction in analyzing impossibility cases see Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLuTm. L. REv. 335, 348-52 (1924).
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tary Manufacturing Co.6 7 the court held that defendant was not discharged from his contractual obligation to pay plaintiff the sum of 1,750
dollars in cash by reason of the "Bank Holiday" of 1933 which prevent-

ed him from withdrawing the funds necessary to pay for the land. 8
The court reasoned that this was a case of subjective impossibility since
others who might have had the foresight to withdraw funds before the
"Bank Holiday" would have been able to perform.6 9

However, the

court just as easily could have taken the position that performance here
was objectively impossible since all persons who had funds on deposit in
a bank would have been unable to perform, and, given the large sum
involved, it is reasonable to assume that both plaintiff and defendant
contemplated that the money would be deposited in a bank until the
closing day. 70
ILLEGALITY

One of the first contingencies recognized as constituting an excuse
for nonperformance of a contract was the illegality of performance of
the contract due to supervening law or regulation. 7 1 The main rationale
given for this rule was that it would have been improper for the courts,
through the award of contractual damages, to have encouraged the
promisor to flout the law.7" Most cases, however, distinguished between performance which violated domestic law and that which violated
foreign law, the latter not constituting an excuse. The reason commonly given for this was that the court had no interest, other than considerations of comity, in encouraging the observance of the law of a foreign
jurisdiction.7 3
67. 68 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
68. The problem of temporary impossibility raises issues which are beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Patterson, Temporary Impossibility of Performance
of Contract,47 VA. L. REv. 798 (1961).
69. 68 S.W.2d at 275.
70. See also Littell v. Webster County, 152 Iowa 206, 131 N.W. 691 (1911);
Zimmerman v. Rice County, 202 Minn. 54, 277 N.W. 360 (1938).
71. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 458 (1932).
72. The "Gold Clause" decisions of the Supreme Court holding that private
obligors were discharged from contractual obligations to make payment in gold by the
Congressional Joint Resolution approved by President Roosevelt on June 5, 1933
prohibiting the public from holding or dealing in gold are among the most notable
examples of impossibility due to illegality. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935);
Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S.
240 (1935). See generally Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions. 33 Micn. L. REv. 647
(1935).
73. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15
F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1936) (German corporation not
discharged from obligation on bonds issued and sold in the United States and payable in
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While the promisor was excused from his obligation of performance because of the passage of a law that had rendered performance
illegal, he was not excused because he had been unable to obtain a
permit necessary, under existing law, to render -his performance legal.
The theory here was that the promisor ordinarily intends to undertake
the obligation to comply with all legal requirements necessary to perform his part of the bargain and should not be excused unless he has
expressly conditioned his duty to perform on successfully obtaining
74
all necessary licenses or other authorizations.
The UCC has continued prior law with respect to illegality and, in
addition, -has expanded it to include illegality under foreign law. 75 This
change seems desirable since it makes little difference to the seller
whether he will be subjected to foreign or domestic sanctions for
performing a contract. Subsection (a) of section 2-615 also makes the
seller's good faith belief that performance will violate a law or regulation
sufficient to excuse performance; thus, he need not await final adjudication in order to determine if he is excused.
In general, the position taken by the Code is sound. It would be
unfair and unwise to hold the promisor liable for damages if his failure
to perform is due to compliance with a law or regulation adopted after
the contract was formed. In this situation, holding the promisor liable
cannot serve to encourage him to take all possible steps to ensure that he
will be able to perform since, unlike many contingencies that render
performance impossible, illegality cannot be guarded against. In the
typical contract of sale, the parties will normally intend that the promisor take all reasonable steps to guard against avoidable contingencies,
but they will not intend that the promisor be an insurer and guard the
promisee against the chance that the law may be changed before performance is completed. Therefore, excusing performance in the case of
illegality seems to be the fairest alternative unless it is clear that the
promisor did, in fact, assume this risk.
Ordinarily, new laws or regulations will apply only to contracts
entered into in futuro so that the problem of supervening illegality will
seldom arise. Occasionally, though, it is necessary to adopt legislation
or regulations that do affect executory contractual commitments. For
New York by decree issued by German government declaring such obligations payable to
the German government).
74. Security Sewage Equip. Co. v. McFerren, 14 Ohio St. 2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898

(1968) (contractor not discharged from duty under contract because of failure to obtain
permit from government approving construction of sewage treatment plant).
75. UNiuoR_ Com.-mcuL CoDE § 2-615(a).
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example, during the OPEC oil embargo the government found it essential to adopt regulations to ensure that what oil was available was
distributed to the most essential uses. 6 This necessarily interfered with
pre-existing contractual obligations between various oil companies and
their customers. Similarly, the natural gas shortage, which was generally not foreseen at the time when many long term supply contracts were
entered into between pipeline companies and producers, has necessitated
the promulgation of allocation regulations by the FEA that have required the modification or abrogation of existing contracts in some
instances.1 In both of these cases there seems to be no equitable reason
why the promisor should be required to bear the loss.78
The mortgage foreclosure cases of the 1930's indicate that when a
true emergency exists and the legislature does not go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to meet the situation, legislation which has the
effect of abrogating or modifying pre-existing contractual obligations
will not violate the parties' rights under the contract clause or due
process clause of the Constitution. 1 Thus, in cases in which such
legislation meets these requirements and is constitutional, the courts
must excuse the promisor under section 2-615. If, on the other hand,
the legislation or regulations are unconstitutional, the courts cannot
excuse the promisor under section 2-615 unless he can establish that he
believed in good faith that they were constitutional. The point is that,
in either case, judicial discretion under the illegality clause of section 2615 is limited; thus, it poses no serious threat to freedom of contract.
IMPLIED CONDITIONS
One of the earliest means by which the English courts avoided the
rule of absolute liability and allowed the distressed promisor to escape a
76. 10C.F.R. §§ 210-12 (1975).
77. 18 C.F.R. part 2 (1975).
78. The Federal Power Commission has taken the position that natural gas pipeline
companies that curtail deliveries pursuant to its orders are immune from suits for specific
performance or damages by customers affected by such curtailments. United Gas
Pipeline Co., No. 71-120 (F.P.C. Op. No. 606, Oct. 5, 1971). However, at least one
court has indicated that a customer affected by such curtailments might be entitled to
recover damages from the pipeline company, although probably not specific performance.
Monsanto Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Note, The Liability of
Natural Gas Pipeline Companies for Breach of Contract Due to FPC-OrderedCurtailment, 1973 DuKE L.J. 867 (1973).
79. In the 1930's, many state legislatures passed statutes suspending or modifying
the right of the mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage in the normal manner. While some
of these statutes were held unconstitutional, many others were held to be a valid exercise
of the police power. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See
generally Skilton, MortgageMoratoriaSince 1933, 92 U. PA. L. Rav. 53 (1943).
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contractual obligation was by finding an implied condition in the contract excusing the promisor if his performance became impossible.
While formally adhering to the adage that a contract must be strictly
performed according to its terms, the courts nevertheless might find it to
be an implied condition of the contract that the parties had intended that
the promisor's obligation should be discharged in the event performance
became impossible. 0 Through the use of the implied condition doctrine, the courts could avoid the charge that they were rewriting the
contract for the parties by utilizing the theory that they were merely
deferring to the parties' intent, albeit that such intent was not actually
expressed in the contract.
The text of section 2-615 does not speak of implied conditions.
The comments, however, seem to leave room for the courts to continue
using the doctrine of implied conditions. Comment 8 provides:
The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of
greater liability by agreement and such agreement is to be found
not only in the expressed terms of the contract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in trade usage and the like.
Thus, the exemptions of this section do not apply when the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of contracting to be included among the business risks which are fairly
to be regarded as part of the dickered terms, either consciously
or as a matter of reasonable commercial interpretationfrom the
circumstances .... 81
Since the doctrine of impossibility has become well established in
American common law and now in the UCC, the initial reason for the
use of the implied or constructive condition rationale no longer exists.
The main problem with the implied condition rationale is that it does
not assist the courts in identifying the underlying policy considerations
which should be examined in determining whether the promisor should
be discharged. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said: "You always can imply
a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it?" ' 2 Thus, when the
court finds that the promisor is discharged because of an "implied
condition," it is resorting to a conclusory form of analysis. The real
question is not whether there is an implied condition, but why there
should be one. In all cases in which the implied condition method of
80. Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1,863); Hyde v. Dean & Canons,
78 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B. 1653) (dictum). See generally Farnsworth, Disputes Over
Omissions in Contracts,68 CoLUM. L. REv. 860 (1968).
81. UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 8 (emphasis added).
82. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in CoLLEcnTD LEGAL PPERs 191 (1920).
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analysis has been utilized, it will be found that the court has actually
relied implicitly on one of the other factors discussed herein, such as
foreseeability, assumption of risk, subjective-objective impossibility, or
illegality, in determining whether the promisor should have been dis83
charged.
Extensive use of the implied condition mode of analysis, without
any consideration of the policy considerations on which the impossibility
defense is based, could result in a rather haphazard application of the
impossibility defense. Fortunately, the courts have come to recognize
that the implied condition method of analysis is not illuminating and
few, if any, recent cases arising under section 2-615 have used it as
84
the rationale for the decision.
INCREASED COST

The courts have -historically been reluctant to discharge the promisor from his obligation merely because the cost of performance has
increased. 5 There are sound reasons for this. First, one of the major
purposes for which a businessman enters into a fixed price contract for
the purohase of goods is to protect himself against future price rises;
thus, it would frustrate his purpose in entering into the contract if the
promisor was discharged merely because the contract became unprofitable to him because of an increase in the market price of the goods or of
some component part thereof to be purohased. To take an extreme
example, it would seem improper to discharge a promisor who had sold
wheat futures short in 1972 merely because the Russian wheat deal had
resulted in a sharp rise in the price of wheat because this is the very type
of risk which a commodities speculator assumes when he enters the
market. Secondly, if mere increased cost allowed the promisor to
escape his duty to perform, the courts would be deluged with cases
involving promisors who, through bad luck or incompetence, had entered into contracts which had become unprofitable to perform.
83. See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 317
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Low's Ezy-Fry Potato Co. v. J.A. Wood Co., 26 Agri. Dec. 583 (U.S.
Dep't Agri. 1967).
84. Those cases arising under section 2-615 which do speak in terms of an implied
condition have used such language only to express their conclusion after utilizing an
analysis based on assumption of risk or foreseeability. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Low's Ezy-Fry Potato Co. v. J.A.
Wood Co., 26 Agri. Dec. 583 (U.S. Dep't Agri. 1967).
85. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Piper, 133 F. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Wilson & Co.
v. Fremont Cake & Metal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950).
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Section 2-615 appears to carry forward without change the prevailing common-law rule. While it could be argued that performance of a
contract becomes "impracticable" under section 2-615(a) if unforeseen

increases in cost would make performance unprofitable to the promisor,
the comments indicate that the draftsmen had no such intention.8 6
The cases arising under section 2-615 have generally agreed with
the comment. In TransatlanticFinancing Corp. v. United States87 the
operator of a ship sought to recover the additional costs of a sea voyage

which resulted from the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956, thus necessitating the diversion of the ship to a route around the Cape of Good

Hope. The court found that performance had not been rendered "commercially impracticable" although the cost of performance had been

increased by 43,972 dollars above the contract price of 305,842.92
dollars because of the diversion. Judge Wright, in rejecting plaintiff's
claim, stated:
While it may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and difficulty of performance never constitute impracticability, to justify
relief there must be more of a variation between expected cost and
the cost of performing by an available alternative than is present
in this case, where the promisor can legitimately be presumed to
have accepted some degree of abnormal risk, and where impracticability is urged on the basis of added expense alone. 88
TransatlanticFinancinginvolved an unanticipated cost increase of
approximately fourteen percent. American Trading & Production
Corp. v. Shell InternationalMarine Ltd.89 was another Suez Canal case
with facts similar to TransatlanticFinancinginvolving an unanticipated
86.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

2-615, Comment 4, provides:

Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost
is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification,
for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at
fixed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or
of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes
a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section
87. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
88. Id. at 319. The court cited section 2-615, Comment 4 in support of its position.
Curiously, this case has become one of the leading precedents under section 2-615,
although it would seem that the UCC is not strictly applicable, since the case involved a
contract for carriage and not a contract for the sale of goods. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE §§ 2-102, -106(1).
Nevertheless, because of the court's discussion of section 2615, it has been cited often in support of decisions in which section 2-615 is squarely
applicable.
89. 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
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cost increase of approximately thirty-two percent. Although the unanticipated cost increase was more than double that in TransatlanticFinancing, the court again found no "commercial impracticability," citing
Restatement of Contracts section 454 and UCC section 2-615, comment
4.90

In a case which arose directly under section 2-615, Maple Farms,
Inc. v. City School District of the City of Elmira,New York, 1 plaintiff
requested a declaratory judgment determining that it had the right to

terminate its contract to supply milk to defendant school district on
grounds of impossibility because the price of raw milk had increased
twenty-three percent between the time the contract was signed and the
date suit was brought. The court found that the increase in cost was
not of sufficient magnitude to render performance "commercially impracticable. 92 The court found the fact that the price of milk had been
increasing during the period immediately preceding the time the contract was signed constituted 'evidence that plaintiff knew of and -had
assumed the risk of a rise in price and concluded:
Where the circumstances reveal a willingness on the part of the
seller to accept abnormal rises in costs, the question of impracticability of performance should be judged by stricter terms than where
the contingency is totally unforeseen. .

.

. There is no precise

point, though such could conceivably be reached, at which an increase in price of raw goods above the norm would be so disproportionate to the risk assumed as to amount to impracticability in
a commercial sense. However, we cannot say on these facts that
-the increase here has reached the point of impracticability in performance of this contract
in light of the risks that we find were
93
assumed by the plaintiff.
In short, the courts in interpreting section 2-615 appear to be
continuing the traditional reluctance of the common law to excuse the
90. Id. at 942. Not all of the "Suez Canal cases" have reached the conclusion that
the promisor should be held liable, although the more recent cases arising under section
2-615 have refused to discharge the promisor. In particular, the English cases arising
out of the closure of the canal during the 1956 war are hopelessly divided. Compare
Socidt6 Franco-Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A. (The Messalia), [1961] 2
Q.B. 278, overruled, Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. VO Sovfracht (The Eugenia),
[19641 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A.), with Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee & Thorl G.m.b.H.,
[1961] 2 All E.R. 179 (H.L.). There has been a considerable amount of commentary on
the Suez Canal cases. See, e.g., Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of
Contract Practices in International Trade, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1413 (1963); Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases,20 HAsr. LJ. 1393 (1969); Schlegel,
supra note 17.
91. 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
92. Id. at 1085, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
93. Id.
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promisor merely because of a moderate increase in the cost of performance, even if the increase results in a loss to the promisor. This position
is sound on many grounds. First, as Comment 4 to section 2-615 points
out, absent any explicit provision to the contrary, it is reasonable to
assume that the parties to a contract intend that the promisor assume the
risk that the contract will become unprofitable since one of the motivating factors which ordinarily induces the promisee to enter into a fixed
price contract for future delivery is -his desire to avoid the vagueries of
the market and to "lock in" a price.94
Secondly, there are strong functional reasons supporting a restrictive rule. If the promisor believes that he has a reasonable chance of
being discharged from the performance of a contract because an unprovided for increase in costs will result in his losing ten percent instead
of making a profit of ten percent on a contract, the rule would tend to
encourage litigation and to discourage timely performance of contracts.
Such a liberal rule of discharge would result in a significant erosion of
the parties' right to contract freely on whatever terms they wish. In the
absence of fraud, coercion, duress, gross disparity in bargaining power,
or some other circumstance that would justify discharging the promisor under the unconscionability clause of the UCC, 95 it: seems highly
improper for a court to relieve a party from his obligation to perform
merely because performance had become unprofitable to him. This
is particularly true today, when the unstable economy of the nineteenseventies should make any manufacturer or producer wary of entering
into a fixed price contract calling for performance over an extended
period of time. Additionally, since there are a variety of ways in which
the promisor may protect himself against increased costs, such as the
use of "cost-plus" contracts, indexing and escalater clauses, there appears to be no great need for a lenient judicial attitude in this area.
Concededly, a different question would be presented in the event of
true runaway inflation where, for example, the consequences of enforcing a contract might be not a mere loss but insolvency for the unfortunate seller. In such a situation, the normal rules of contract law break
94. For the text of Comment 4 see note 86 supra.
95. "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result." UNIFORM COMmERCrAL CODE § 2-302(1).
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down, and the courts might properly discharge a party from performance of the contract although he had not expressly provided for the
contingency. 96 The last sentence of Comment 4 to section 2-615,
although not specifically referring to inflation, indicates that any factor
resulting in an extreme increase in cost might justify discharging the
9 7
promisor.
This distinction was drawn by the German courts during the severe

inflation experienced in the post-World War I era. At first, when
inflation was serious but not of a runaway nature, the courts generally
refused to discharge the promisor from his duty to perform even though

enforcement of the contract in many cases caused significant losses to
be incurred by many individual promisors. In 1921 and 1922, however,

when price levels were doubling almost daily, the courts finally relented
and granted discharge from obligations or required renegotiation of them

by the parties.98 Similarly, the runaway inflation in both the North and
the South in the post-Civil War era caused some courts to void or modify

contractual obligations. 99
The practical problem in the case of increased cost is in delineating
the boundary between that level of inflation which justifies judicial re-

lief and that which does not. There might be general agreement that
an increase in the cost of performance of one percent between the time
the contract was formed and the date of performance would not justify

relief, while a tenfold increase would justify such relief. In any less
extreme cases, however, it would be difficult to arrive at a consensus of

opinion. In general, judicial intervention in such situations should be
limited to cases in which it would be truly unconscionable to enforce the
96. An analogy can be made here to the "pre-existing duty" line of consideration
cases in which courts have recognized as binding a second promise by the promisor to
perform a pre-existing duty in exchange for a promise by the promisce to perform
additional services beyond his original promise if circumstances have rendered the value
of the original promise by the promisee valueless. Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11
N.W. 284 (1882). Similarly, in the case of runaway inflation, there may be a total
frustration of purpose which, as in the pre-existing duty cases, can be considered to result
in a failure of consideration rendering the contract voidable.
97. "But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency
such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply
or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller
from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this
section." UNIFORM COMMERCA L CODE § 2-615, Comment 4 (emphasis added).
98. An excellent discussion of the problems resulting from the inflation in Germany following World War I can be found in Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private
Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MicH. L. REV. 171 (1934).
99. Dawson, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 18611879, 33 MicH. L. REV, 706 (1935).

1976]

UCC SECTION 2-615

567

contract as written in light of such factors as the foreseeability of the
level of increased cost and the expectations of the parties at the time the
contract was entered into. Any less stringent rule would result in
excessive uncertainty being introduced into the contracting process.
This would inevitably be accompanied by an excessive amount of
costly and time-consuming litigation as disappointed sellers attempted to
secure judicial relief from imprudent bargains. 00
FORESEEABILITY OF THE CONTINGENCY

Another factor which has been considered highly significant in
analyzing impossibility cases is the foreseeability of the contingency that
has allegedly rendered performance impossible. Generally, courts have
taken the position that if the contingency adversely affecting the promisor's performance was foreseeable at the time the contract was signed,
the fact that the contract contained no provision discharging the promisor's duties under the contract indicated that the promisor implicitly
agreed to assume the consequences of nonperformance in the event the
contingency occurred. 10 If, on the other hand, the contingency was
not foreseeable at the time the contract was signed, there could be no
presumption that the promisor intended to assume the risk of that
particular contingency, and the promisor was discharged. 0 2
The foreseeability test, however, is subject to criticism on several
grounds. 0 3 First, the fact that the risk is foreseeable does not necessarily compel the inference that the promisor intended to assume the risk
merely because he did not provide for it. While the promisor will
normally insist on an express clause excusing him from performance for
contingencies within the ordinary course of his business, such as strikes
and the unavailability of supplies, he may be less likely to exempt
himself from occurrences which, though foreseeable, relate only indirectly to his business, e.g., the closing of the Suez Canal.1" 4
100. See A. Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflation (unpublished manuscript presented
at Association of American Law Schools Meeting in Washington, D.C., Dec. 28, 1975).
101. Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d
Cir. 1945); Nebaco, Inc. v. Riverview Realty Co., 87 Nev. 55, 482 P.2d 305 (1971).

102. RESTATEMENT oF CoNTx~ers § 457 (1932). The comments to the Restatement provide: "It is only where the promisor has no reason to know of the facts to
which the impossibility is due, and where he does not agree to bear the risk of their
existence that the formation of a contract is prevented." Id. § 456, comment c at 84748 (1932).
103. For an excellent discussion of the deficiencies of the foreseeability test see
Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STrA. L. REv. 812, 833-38
(1961).
104. See, e.g., Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. VO Sovfracht (The Eugenia), [1964]
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Secondly, there is the danger that, once a contingency has occurred, it will appear in retrospect to have been reasonably foreseeable
although prior to its occurrence it was in fact foreseen by few, if any,
persons.1" 5 For example, economists today have readily explained the
1973-74 inflationary surge as resulting from factors such as excessive
growth of the money supply, excessive federal budget deficits, and the
devaluation of the dollar. Nevertheless, few economists had predicted
this virulent inflation prior to its onset despite the fact that all of the
above mentioned factors could have been ascertained before it commenced. 1°6 Therefore, because its causes are so clear in retrospect, a
court today considering an impossibility case which resulted from this
inflation could easily forget that it was not actually foreseen by most
17
people. 0
Thirdly, the burden of showing that a particular risk was not
foreseeable in any given case may be difficult to discharge. 0 8 In some
cases, this may be due to the hindsight effect discussed above. More
significant, though, is the well-recognized difficulty of proving a negative. 0 9
Finally, in applying the foreseeability test, courts generally have
focused on the particularcontingency that rendered performance impossible, and, if it did not appear to have been reasonably foreseeable at the
time the contract was signed, the promisor was excused. In so doing,
however, the courts have ignored the fact that while the particular
contingency that occurred was not foreseeable, the parties could have
foreseen that contingencies of the type that occurred were possible and
could affect performance of the promisor's obligations. Therefore, in
many cases a general force majeure clause could have been included
2 Q.B. 226 (C.A.) (parties considered possibility of closure of Suez Canal during
performance but made no provision for it in the contract; held: promisor not discharged).
105. Although none of the impossibility cases discusses the issue in detail, it would
appear that the foreseeability test that has been applied by most courts is what should
have been reasonably foreseeable to a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence who
was in the position of the contracting parties at the time the contract was formed. E.g.,
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
106. Cf. Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
107. Cf. Patterson, supra note 66.
108. The party seeking to establish his discharge from the contract by reason of
impossibility bears the burden of proof of showing that the contingency that rendered
performance impossible was not foreseeable at the time the contract was entered into.
Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1945).
109. 9 3. WIGMORE, EVwENCu § 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
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which would have discharged the promisor even though the particular
contingency that occurred was not foreseeable. 110 Thus, to the extent
that the foreseeability test is based on the unfairness of holding the
promisor liable for contingencies that he could not have anticipated, it is
unfounded in many cases.
In short, application of the foreseeability test has led to mistaken
results in many cases. The first three factors mentioned have tended to
place a high burden on the promisor seeking discharge, while the fourth
tends to favor the promisor. Thus, while the foreseeability test cannot
be characterized as overly harsh or overly lenient from the promisor's
viewpoint, it is apparent that its application can lead to incorrect decisions.
The UCC does not refer specifically to the foreseeability factor in
the text of section 2-615. The comments to section 2-615, however,
indicate that the draftsmen contemplated that courts would consider the
foreseeability factor in applying section 2-615. Comment 1 provides
that "[t]his section excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods contracted for, where his performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.""' Additionally,
Comment 4 provides in part, that "[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse
performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contin2
gency which alters the essential nature of the performance.""1
Fortunately, courts have not seized upon the language in the
comments as an excuse to perpetuate the foreseeability test. In Transatlantic Financing for example, Judge Skelly Wright held that even
though the parties should have foreseen that the Suez Canal might be
closed due to war at the time they entered into the contract, this alone
was insufficient to defeat the impossibility defense."13 In analyzing the
impossibility issue, the court followed a three stage method of analysis
which subsequently has become widely accepted. "First, a contingency-something unexpected-must have occurred. Second, the risk
110. Cf. Berman, supra note 90, at 1428-39.
111. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 1.
112. Id., Comment 4. Although the Code and the cases do not discuss the issue, it
would appear that the standard to be applied in determining whether a contingency was
foreseeable should be an objective one, i.e. whether the event is such that the ordinary
prudent man could reasonably have been expected to foresee it. Cf. Transatlantic
Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Maple Farms, Inc. v.
City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
113. 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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of the unexpected occurrence must not have been allocated either
by agreement or by custom. Finally, occurrence of the contingency
' 4
must have rendered performance commercially impracticable.""
In discussing the second element of the test, assumption of risk, the
court attempted to determine the foreseeability of the canal's closing but
did not consider the factor alone to be dispositive of the issue. In the
court's words:
Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation.... Parties to a contract are not always able
to provide for all the possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they can not agree, often simply because they are too
busy. Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated is
probative but does not necessarily establish an allocation of the
risk of the contingency which actually occurs." 0
The TransatlanticFinancing opinion has set the tone for subsequent cases arising under section 2-615, and most courts, while considering foreseeability in determining whether section 2-615 is applicable
to a given case, have not allowed this element to be controlling." 0 This
rejection of the foreseeability test is a constructive development in the
evolution of the impossibility defense. As the court pointed out in
TransatlanticFinancing, the allocation of the risk of the contingency
affecting performance should be the central factor in determining
7
whether section 2-615 should operate to discharge the promisor.1
While the foreseeability of the contingency has significant probative
value in determining its allocation, it is not the only factor which needs
to be examined to determine whether the promisor assumed the risk of
its occurrence. Thus, as with any other test that does not directly focus
on determining the intent of the parties, use of the foreseeability factor
by itself can lead to a result which contravenes the intent of the parties.
AsSUMPTION OF RISK

When the promisor raises the defense of impossibility, a court
utilizing the assumption of risk mode of analysis attempts to determine
114. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
116. See American Trading & Production Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine, Ltd., 453 F.2d
939 (2d Cir. 1972); Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Mishara
Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., - Mass. -, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974);
Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct.
1974).
117. See 363 F.2d at 315-19.
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if the parties, at the time the contract was entered into, intended that the
promisor assume the risk of the occurrence of the contingency which the
promisor now claims should discharge his obligation of performance.
If the promisor is found to have assumed the risk, he will not be
discharged. If, however, the court determines that the risk was not
allocated to the promisor by the parties, the defense of impossibility will
apply and the promisor will be discharged.
The use of assumption of risk analysis can be found in many
common law cases and is approved by the Restatement.""' In the wellknown case of Madeirense Do Brasil, S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber

Co." 9 the Second Circuit refused to discharge defendant from his
contractual obligation to deliver lumber to New York. The promisor
had been unable to obtain a ship because of a shortage caused by the
war. The court found that "the lack of ships in January, 1941 was a
foreseeable risk which plaintiff willingly took upon itself; and it cannot
under such circumstances plead the defense of 'force majeure.' "120 On
the other hand, in Housing Authority of City of Bristol v. East Tennessee Light & Power Co.' 2' the court sustained the defense of impossibility

in an action brought against the power company for failure to supply
natural gas to buldings owned by plaintiff. The court found that both
parties had contemplated the continued existence of a particular source
of gas as a condition of defendant's obligation to supply gas under the
contract. Thus defendant had not assumed the risk that this source of
gas would cease during the term of the contract, and, when it did, his
duty to supply gas under the contract was discharged.' 2 2 In addition,
many cases involving construction contracts in which the contractor is
seeking to be discharged because of an unexpected contingency have
been decided on an assumption of risk analysis. 2
UCC section 2-615(a) is a codification, in rather obscure language, of the assumption of risk test of impossibility. Although section
2-615(a) establishes a basic test of "impracticability," such impracticability only provides an excuse if it results from the "occurrence of a
118.

RESTATE ENT oF CoNTRACTS § 457 (1932).

119.

147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1945).

120. Id. at 403.

121. 183 Va. 64, 31 S.E.2d 273 (1944).
122. Id. at 75, 31 S.E.2d at 278.
123. City of Albertville v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 272 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1960); Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (Alas. 1974); Security
Sewage Equip. Co. v. MeFerren, 14 Ohio St. 2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898 (1968).
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contingency, the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made." The impracticability test is also qualified by the introductory phrase to section 2-615: "[e]xcept so far as a
seller may have assumed a greater obligation. ..

."

In other words,

section 2-615 only discharges the seller if the impracticability results
from an event, the risk of which the seller neither expressly nor impliedly agreed to assume.
The cases arising under section 2-615 involving economic instability almost without exception follow the assumption of risk type of
analysis suggested by the statutory language. Judge Wright's opinion in
TransatlanticFinancing1 24 has been influential in establishing a pattern
of analysis which has been followed by many courts in section 2-615
cases. The second step in the three part analysis established by Judge
Wright, it will be recalled, requires the court to find that "the risk of
the unexpected occurrence . . . [has] been allocated either by agreement or by custom.' 25 Other recent cases have also followed the as-

sumption of risk form of analysis. 2 '
The fact that many recent cases have utilized the assumption of
risk analysis is a most constructive development. Contract is a consensual medium of doing business. In resolving any contractual dispute,
the primary task of the court should be determining how the parties
intended to deal with the contingency that led to the dispute. Thus, in a
case in which the defense of impossibility is raised the court should first
attempt to determine whether the parties themselves contemplated the
contingency and, if so, how the risk of its occurrence was allocated
between them.' 2 7 The policy reasons underlying the assumption of risk
form of analysis were well stated by Judge Reardon in Mishara ConstructionCo. v. Transit-MixedConcrete Corp.:128
124. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
125. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
126. Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1974); Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967); United States v.
Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed
Concrete Corp., - Mass. -, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School
Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
127. This still leaves the problem of deciding what to do in those cases in which it is
found that the parties did contemplate the contingency but did not allocate it in the
contract. Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. VO Sovfracht (The Eugenia), [1964] 2 Q.B.
226 (C.A.). The author's proposed amendment of section 2-615, which would establish a presumption that the seller assumed the risk of all contingencies not expressly allocated by the parties, would ease the burden of the courts in this situation
considerably. See text accompanying notes 135-49 infra.
128.

-

Mass. -,

310 N.E.2d 363 (1974).
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It is, of course, the very essence of contract that it is directed at
the elimination of some risks for each party in exchange for others.
Each receives the certainty of price, quantity, and time, and assumes the risk of changing market prices, superior opportunity, or
added costs. It is implicit in the doctrine of impossibility (and
companion rule of "frustration of purpose") that certain risks are
so unusual and have such severe consequences that they must have
been beyond the scope of the assignment of risks inherent in the
contract, that is, beyond -the agreement made by the parties. To
require performance in that case would be to grant the promisee
he could not be said to have bargained in
an advantage for which
29
making the contract.1
Virtually all other factors that have been discussed previously, including
foreseeability, subjective impossibility, increased cost, and illegality, are
of probative value in tending to establish whether the promisor assumed
the risk of the occurrence of the contingency on which he bases his
defense of impossibility. Yet any analysis of these factors that views
each of them as conclusive in itself and not merely bearing on the
assumption of risk issue runs the risk of reaching a result that contravenes the original intent of the parties in allocating the risk of its

occurrence.
Perhaps the major difficulty with an assumption of risk analysis is
that in many situations it is not clear from the face of the contract how
the parties intended to allocate the risk of the occurrence of the contingency which led to the impossibility of performance. 3 0 Indeed, in
many cases, the contingency that occurred may not have been contemplated by the parties at all, or the parties deliberately may have failed to
allocate the risk because they could not agree as to which party should
assume it. In many cases, then, the courts must examine the factual
background of the contract to determine what the parties intended or
what they would have intended had the contingency been anticipated.
Thus, even an assumption of risk test is not totally immune from
the danger that courts will reach a result that contravenes the true intent
of the parties. However, at least the difficulty with the assumption of
risk test is evidentiary and not indigenous to the nature of the test itself.
A court attempting to apply assumption of risk analysis to impossibility
cases should reach a correct result more often than one applying a
straight foreseeability analysis.
129. Id. at-, 310 N.E.2d at 367.
130. Cf. Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v.

2 Q.B. 226 (C.A.).

V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), [1964]
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SYNTHESIS

Section 2-615 on its face appears to give courts a great deal of
discretion in determining whether the promisor should be discharged
from his contractual obligation when the defense of impossibility is
raised. The use of the standard of "commercial impracticability" gives
courts the power to void a contractual obligation in many situations in
which a strict standard of "impossibility" would not allow the promisor
to be discharged. The language of section 2-615, which requires the
courts to make a determination whether the risk of the occurrence of the
contingency which rendered performance impracticable was allocated to
the promisee or to the promisor, gives courts considerable leeway since
the contingency causing the impossibility will seldom have been allocated expressly by the contract.
Those few cases decided to date indicate that the courts have not
utilized the discretion given them by section 2-615 to modify drastically
the contractual obligations of the parties; the courts, thus far, have been
adhering to the old common-law standards of impossibility in interpreting section 2-615. In particular, they have not seized upon vague
language to excuse the promisor-seller in cases in which the increased
cost of performance has rendered performance unprofitable. Furthermore, the courts have generally tended to take the position that the
promisor in a contract for the sale of goods assumes the risk of those
contingencies that were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract
was entered into. In short, although the language of section 2-615 does
not follow any traditional common-law test, the courts have generally
adhered to common-law standards in interpreting the section in cases
arising from economic and political disturbances that are covered by
Article Two.
There is, however, substantial reason to fear that during the next
few years courts will be under increasing pressure to excuse the promisor because his performance has become unprofitable or otherwise
impracticable due to changing economic conditions. The few "economic disturbance" type cases that have arisen thus far under the UCC may
well prove to be merely the prelude to a deluge of litigation under
section 2-615 if economic disturbances continue, as seems likely. 18 1
The experience of Germany in the years following World War I and of
131. The Westinghouse Electric litigation with several electric utility companies
concerning long term contracts to supply uranium, discussed in the text accompanying
notes 1-4 supra, is an example.
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the United States in the decade immediately following the Civil War
indicates that severe inflationary periods are likely to lead to a significant increase in litigation involving promisors seeking relief from unsuing
profitable contractual obligations or by disappointed promisees
13 2
promisors who have failed to perform unprofitable obligations.
Such a flood of litigation would be unfortunate in several respects.
First, it would add significantly to what is in many courts an already
burdensome caseload. Secondly, if the parties to contracts in a significant number of cases must await the outcome of what may be lengthy
litigation to determine what the respective rights and liabilities of each
may be, uncertainty in business dealings will increase. Thirdly, such
litigation may lead in many cases to a judicial reallocation of risks of
nonperformance that had been fixed by the parties at the time the
contract was formed, thus impinging on the parties' freedom of contract.
While there are undoubtedly a few cases in which for reasons of public
policy or equity the courts should make such a determination, this will
not be true in the vast majority of contracts involving the sale of goods
between businessmen which fall within the scope of Article Two of the
133
UCC.
One distinguished commentator has characterized the law of contracts as the delegation of the lawmaking function by the government to
private individuals. 134 To the extent that the ground rules for such
private lawmaking remain vague and uncertain, the private law decisions of the parties-contracts-will be thrown back upon an agency of
the government-the courts. This shift will remove many of the benefits of delegation of the lawmaking power to private parties.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO UCC SECTIoN

2-615

For the reasons mentioned above, it would be desirable to amend
UCC section 2-615 to read as follows:
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, and subject to the provisions of sections 2-613 and 2-614:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part resulting
from the occurrence of any contingency that makes it impos132. See Dawson, supra notes 98 & 99.
133. Some courts have adhered to a strict rule by requiring that there be total
frustration of purpose or total impossibility of performance to excuse the promisor. See
Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); Levy Plumbing Co. v. Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co., 68 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
134. See Jones, The Jurisprudenceof Contracts,44 U. CIN. L. REv. 43 (1975).
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sible for the seller to perform his obligations shall be presumed to be a breach of the seller's duty of performance under
the contract, unless the seller establishes that the parties intended that the seller be discharged from his obligation by the
occurrence of such contingency, or unless such breach results
from compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it
later proves to be invalid.
(b) When the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a
part of the seller's capacity to perform, unless the contract
provides otherwise, he must allocate production and deliveries
among his customers under contract in a manner that is fair
and.reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be
delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under
paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available
for the buyer.
1. Establishment of Presumption that Seller Assumed the Risk of All
ContingenciesAffecting Performance.
The proposed amendment would establish a rebuttable presumption that the seller assumed the risk of the occurrence of any contingency rendering performance impossible. Furthermore, the language of
that section has been reworded to indicate more clearly that an assumption of risk analysis is called for. Finally, the word "impracticable" has
been replaced by "impossible" to indicate that the section comes into
play only in extreme cases and not in those in which performance has
merely been rendered inconvenient or unprofitable.
This test would have several advantages over the present provision.
First, it should provide a more workable standard than presently exists.
The fact that few courts have followed the statutory language closely in
analyzing an impossibility defense under section 2-615 results largely
from the fact that the present language provides little or no guidance in
determining how the court should decide whether the promisor should
be discharged from his obligation. The proposed language should serve
to clarify the test that courts should apply and therefore lead to a more
35
uniform application of the section.'
135. For a complete discussion of the opposite viewpoint, that the courts should be
left with a considerable amount of discretion in handling impossibility cases, see Coons,
Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW.
U.L. REv. 750 (1964).

1976]

UCC SECTION 2-615

Secondly, the presumption appears to comport with the normal

understanding or expectation of the parties to the typical contract for the
sale of goods.

Ordinarily, the parties to such a contract take it for

granted that the seller will protect himself or at least assume responsibility for all risks within his control with the exception of those that he
has specifically excluded in the contract. Thus, the fact that the partic-

ular contingency that occurred and made the contract impracticable to
perform may not have been foreseeable is irrelevant since it is foreseeable that events of some type may occur that will render performance
impossible or impracticable. For example, in the much discussed "Suez
Canal cases"'136 arising out of the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and

again in 1973, the parties to a contract for shipment of goods through
the canal may not have foreseen or considered the possibility that the
canal would be closed, but surely it must have occurred to them that
some type of occurrence, such as a war, a longshoremen's strike, or bad
weather might intervene and affect the shipper's ability to perform. In
the absence of any exclusionary clause, it would therefore seem reasona37
ble to place the liability on the shipper.'

Thirdly, the establishment of such a presumption should increase
certainty in business dealings. In most business contexts, it is of little

importance in the long run whether the promisor or the promisee
assumes the risk of nonperformance as long as a definite rule exists so
that the parties can accurately predict in advance which party must bear
the risk of nonperformance. If one party is aware that -hebears the risk
of nonperformance he can either specifically exclude that risk from the

contract,

38

adjust his price to compensate for the fact that he will be

bearing that risk, or, in some circumstances, insure -himself against the

risk of liability associated with nonperformance. Thus, in the long run
136. See note 90 supra.
137. See Berman, supra note 90, at 1420-24.
138. Comment 8 to section 2-615 provides, however, that "this section itself sets up
the commercial standard for normal and reasonable interpretation and provides a
minimum beyond which agreement may not go." If the purpose of this comment is to
suggest that there are limits to the extent to which the seller may provide in the contract
for his discharge by reason of impossibility, the comment does not seem to be supported
by the language of the statute itself, which indicates that the buyer and seller are always
free to provide for the seller's discharge in the event of any specified contingency. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIrL Code § 2-615. To the extent that this comment indicates a
draftsman's concern that powerful sellers may force extremely liberal force majeure
clauses upon weaker buyers, it would not appear to be justified. First, in a commercial
context, it seems equally as probable that the buyer will have greater bargaining power
than the seller. Secondly, if a force majeure clause is so sweeping as to be unconscionable, it can always be stricken from the contract under the "unconscionable" provisions
of section 2-302.
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it is inconsequential whether the promisor or the promisee bears the
risk."5 9 If the promisor bears the risk, he will pass on the costs such
risk entails to the promisee through higher product prices. If the
promisor is excused, either contractually or through a liberal application
of the doctrine of impossibility, then the buyer will bear the cost directly
through insurance premiums or through increased costs associated with
arranging substitute contracts in the event the original promisor is
excused. The point is that if the parties to the contract are reasonably
certain who bears the risk of nonperformance, they can factor that risk
into the negotiations surrounding the contract. Under the existing
vague impracticability standard, however, the decision whether section
2-615 will discharge the promisor is basically a question of fact to be
resolved by the court, and the parties will be uncertain as to which party
will bear the loss until actual judicial resolution of each case.
Fourthly, the proposed standard would still allow the seller to
modify the statutory presumption and shift the risk of the occurrence of
any or all contingencies to the buyer through appropriate language in
the contract. 140 With respect to contracts for the sale of goods covered
by section 2-615, it is relatively easy to draft a clause excusing the
seller's duty of performance in the event of the occurrence of any
contingencies beyond his control that result in inability to perform. It is
not necessary that each contingency be specified. Thus through a
simple clause it is easy for the parties to overcome the statutory pre4
sumption if that is what they wish to do.' 1
Finally, the establishment of such a presumption is at least as fair
and equitable as the present rule of section 2-615. Although it has
been asserted that the rule of absolute liability (which the proposed
amendment comes close to establishing) is harsh and the rule of discharge is "fair," it might well be asked, "fair to whom?" If the
promisor is freed from his obligation to perform a contract that has
become unprofitable, the loss which the promisor would have incurred
had he not been excused must be borne by the promisee who will have
139. Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 49-50 (1972).
140. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-303 makes it clear that the seller does have
the right to modify contractually the impossibility provisions of section 2-615. But see
note 138. See also Patterson, supra note 66 (concerning the ability of the seller to
contract out of a strict impossibility rule).
141. A clause providing that "seller shall not be liable for delays in delivery or nondelivery caused by strikes, fines, riots, war, embargoes, shortages, economic disturbances
nor any other causes beyond seller's control" would be sufficient to shift the risk of
virtually every contingency that might affect performance back to the buyer in a contract
for the sale of goods.
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to enter into a new contract in place of the one with the promisor.
Thus, since the rule of discharge merely shifts the loss from the promisor to the promisee, it is not any fairer than the rule of absolute liability. Whichever rule is followed, a loss will be borne by one party or
the other. The fairest solution in this situation is voluntary renegotiation of the agreement between the promisor and the promisee.
Perhaps the most serious objection to the proposed. rule is that it
might prove too harsh in application when applied to transactions
involving inexperienced sellers and, in particular, to sellers who are not
merchants. It is conceivable that such sellers might not be aware of, or
appreciate the legal consequences of, the proposed rule. Thus, they
might neglect to protect themselves, either by insurance or by appropriate exculpatory language, from the consequences of their inability to
perform.
There are several answers to this problem. One is that the proposed rule merely establishes a rebuttable presumption; the major reason for making the presumption rebuttable is to allow the introduction
of evidence that would indicate that because of the status of the particular seller it is improper to assume that the seller intended to assume the
risk of nonperformance. A second answer is that if it appeared that a
knowledgeable buyer had taken advantage of an ignorant seller in a
particular situation, UCC section 2-302 would allow the court to declare
the bargain void and excuse the seller on the ground that the contract
was "unconscionable.1' 14 2 Another possible response to this objection
would be to limit the application of the presumption that the seller
assumed the risk of all contingencies affecting performance to transactions "between merchants" as defined in section 2-104(1). This step
has been taken with several other sections in Article Two of the UCC for
reasons similar to those present here with no apparent problems resulting.'

43

2. Elimination of Duty to Allocate to Regular Customers Not Under
Contract.
Section 2-615(b), in its present form, imposes upon a seller whose
capacity to perform is only partially affected the duty to allocate his
output among customers. The seller is given the right, at his option, to
include in such allocations not only those customers with whom he has
142. See note 95 supra.
143. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-201, -205, -207, -209.

580

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

contracts but also "regular customers not then under contract as well as
his own requirements for further manufacture."'144 The Code does not

specify the manner in which such allocations should be made but gives
the right to the seller to allocate "in any manner which is fair and
reasonable."' 1"

This provision constitutes a serious and unjustifiable infringement
on the contractual rights of those customers who are under contract with
the seller. Since subsection (b) authorizes the seller to treat buyers not
under contract equally with buyers under contract, it removes one of the
main incentives for a buyer to commit himself contractually to the seller.
Ordinarily, the chief reason a buyer is willing to commit himself to the
future purchase of goods is that he thus obtains a prior claim to those
goods ahead of those who are not under contract; yet section 2-615(b)
undercuts this expectation. 46
Furthermore, in a situation in which prices have advanced, the
seller will have every incentive to allocate as much of his production as
144. Id. § 2-615(b).
145. Id. At least one court has held that the provisions of section 2-615(b) can be
modified contractually. Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868,
204 S.E.2d 625 (1974). See also Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 79 CoM. L.J. 75 (1974). Thus, a seller could commit
himself to deliver all of his output to one customer although absent such a contractual
provision he would be under a duty to allocate output among all of his customers.
Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973); North Penn
Oil & Tire Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 358 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
146. Furthermore, the section leads to an anomalous situation which can best be
illustrated as follows: Suppose seller S has ten contracts with buyers 1 through 10 to
deliver to each 100 bushels of wheat. In addition, S, who usually has more than 1000
bushels of wheat available will sell one hundred bushels of wheat each to buyers 11
through 20. Suppose that, due to a partial crop failure, in a given year S has only 1000
bushels of wheat to sell. In this case, subsection (b) would not appear to allow the
seller to allocate production among buyers 1 through 10 (under contract) and buyers 11
through 20 (not under contract) since subsection (b) only applies when performance on
contracts with buyers under contract has become "impracticable" under subsection (a).
Since there is precisely enough grain, and no more, available to fulfill S's contractual
commitments, subsection (a) does not apply and therefore S has no right to allocate
under subsection (b).
But now suppose that instead of exactly 1000 bushels S only produces 900 bushels.
This produces a partial impossibility under (a) and thus gives S the right to allocate
under (b), which right may include not only customers 1 through 10 but also customers
11 through 20. Thus, the shortfall in production necessary to fulfill S's contractual
commitments, although amounting to only ten percent, gives S the right to allocate
among noncontractual customers. This in turn may reduce the allocation to contractual
customers much more than ten percent. Indeed, if equal allocation is made to all
customers, each would receive 450 bushels so that a ten percent shortfall in the amount
needed to fulfill seller's contractual commitments gives S the right to curtail sales to
contractual customers by fifty-five percent. Such a result is illogical and illustrates the
fallacy in allowing the inclusion of noncontractual customers in an allocation by the
seller.
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possible to those customers not under contract whom he can charge a
higher price. Comment 11 recognizes this problem and provides that in
cases of doubt customers under contract should be favored, but such an
expectation may be more hopeful than realistic.' 47 Thus, in times of
acute shortages, especially if such shortage is accompanied by rising
prices, the present language seems certain to lead to a considerable
amount of litigation by disgruntled buyers under contract who find that
a portion of the seller's production has gone at a higher price to buyers
not under contract.
The rationale for the right to include customers not under contract
in any allocation is stated in comment 11 as permitting "a fair and
reasonable attention to the needs of regular customers who are probably
relying on spot orders for supplies.' u48 The simple answer to this is
that customers with a strong need for the seller's products should enter
into futures contracts with the seller. To allow them to share in the
seller's scarce output with buyers under contract is to allow them one of
the major benefits of having a contract with seller while escaping the
burden of it. 49
Perhaps the major justification for this provision is that there may
be regular, noncontractual customers of the seller whose needs are more
urgent than those of customers under contract and that public policy
should allow the seller to include such customers in any allocation that
he may make. However, granting the fact that there may be times when
the contractual rights of buyers should be subordinated to those of other
parties, it does not seem wise to allow the seller to make such a
judgment concerning public policy himself. First, since almost any
shortage situation will be accompanied by rising prices in the absence of
wage-price controls, the seller is not likely to be wholly impartial in
making a judgment regarding the relative priorities of various customers' needs. Secondly, the seller is not likely to be in the best position to
make any judgment of conflicting social priorities. Such decision,
147. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 11 provides, in relevant part:
"However, good faith requires, when prices have advanced, that the seller exercise real
care in making his allocations, and in case of doubt his contract customers should be
favored and supplies prorated evenly among them regardless of price." In addition, it
provides that "any allocation [to customers not under contract] which exceeds normal
past requirements will not be reasonable." Thus, even Comment 11 could be interpreted
as allowing the seller to make delivery of the amounts normally supplied to regular
customers not under contract while delivering less than normal requirements to customers under contract.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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which must balance the contractual rights of the buyer against the public interest in having others receive scarce resources, is best made by
the legislature or by an administrative agency that can examine all of the
facts. The speedy development of fuel allocation regulations following
the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74 indicates that Congress can move
quickly when a shortage of some vital commodity threatens to disrupt
the functioning of society.
In summary, it would be wise to delete the language from subsection (b) giving the seller the right to include customers not under
contract in any allocation that might be made. In addition, it would
seem wise to add language to (b) giving the seller the right to modify
his duty to allocate contractually. The present language of section 2615 and the comments is silent on whether the seller can modify
contractually the allocation provisions of this section. Since we have
concluded that it is wiser to leave it to the legislature to intervene in
situations in which public policy requires an allocation, there would
seem to be no reason why the parties, in the absence of such legislative
direction, should not be allowed to provide that a particular buyer shall
or shall not be allowed to share in an allocation.'" °
3. Retention of Sections 2-613, 2-614 and the Illegality Exemption of
Section 2-615.
Since sections 2-613, 2-614 and the illegality exemption of section
2-615 have the effect of reversing the presumption that would be
established by the revisions to section 2-615, a word is in order concerning the reasons for their retention. Section 2-613, which generally
excuses the seller when specific goods under contract have been destroyed without his fault, codifies a well-recognized common-law rule.
150. Several courts have indicated that the parties to a contract are free to modify
contractually the allocation provisions of section 2-615(b). Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (seller under no duty to allocate when
contract contains provision expressly excusing seller from duty of performance because
of impossibility); North Penn Oil & Tire Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 358 F. Supp. 908
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (same); Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868,
204 S.E.2d 625 (1974) (seller can contractually commit himself to deliver all of his
output to one of several buyers when in the absence of such a commitment he would
be under a duty to allocate).
Any amendment to the UCC raises the practical difficulty that its adoption must
be secured, one by one, in all of the jurisdictions which have adopted the UCC if it
is to remain "uniform." For this reason, it would seem desirable for this amendment
to be submitted to state legislatures for adoption as part of a general package of revisions to Article Two of the Code at such time in the future as a general reexamination
of Article Two is made,
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Ordinarily, the parties to a contract expect the seller to take all reasonable steps to insure performance. However, the parties do not ordinarily expect the seller to be the buyer's insurer. Therefore, the reversal of
the presumption established by revised section 2-615 seems desirable in
this situation.
Section 2-614, which deals with substitute means of delivery and
payment, is not directly relevant to the problems that the revisions to
section 2-615 are designed to resolve. Since this section is not directly
affected by the proposed amendments to section 2-615, it should be
retained in its existing form.
Finally, the language in original section 2-615, excusing the seller
if performance has been made "impracticable because of compliance in
good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order," has been retained. This language has the effect of
reversing the presumption of section 2-615. For the reasons discussed
in the section on illegality it seems reasonable to retain this exempS
tion.' '

151. See text accompanying notes 71-78 supra.

